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-iction t~ u r r s appeal is conferred on the Court 
W- -"* ' -^  ..*i-\*\w {19891 T"l le natter was 
pouted o1 . 
HI .June 28, 1 !> 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I1 In i s s u e s prcijeutLt ill Il ,' I he apped I nn : 
/i Does t h e "law of the c a s e " d o c t r i n e ! p r e v e n t t h e t r i a l 
c I HI IIII I in IIII I I in second t r i a l of a m a t t r r , trnni r p r e i v i n q and 
^ i d e r i n y e v i d e n c e o i ilic i jLudJ i JI'IJUIIICJ" ii i II • p u i "IJIS os 
Hj d e t e r m i n a t i v e of t h e c o r r e c t v a l u e of t h e s e r v i c e s of t h e 
' *- - "* i i in Q u e s t i o n of law Lo be r e v i e w e d by t h i s 
v-ourt fo r c o r r e i ' 
lDoelle v Hrad l ey , 784 P . 2 d 1176 (Utah 1 9 8 9 ) . 
B. If the appellate court has erroneously assumed facts 
when those facts have been specifically briefed by Appellee, 
is the trial court precluded from taking evidence and basing 
its decision on the actual facts? The issue of whether the 
trial court has discretion is a question of law to be reviewed 
by this Court for correctness.2 
C. When attempting to find the value of the services of 
a party to a contract should the court determine what value the 
parties would have put on the services at the time they entered 
into the contract given the facts and circumstances extant at 
that time, or should it determine the value of the services by 
taking evidence as to what was actually done by the party 
seeking compensation? This is a question of law to be reviewed 
by this Court for correctness.3 
AUTHORITY 
The following cases, among others, may be determinative of 
the issues stated: 
Major v. Benton, 647 F.2d 110 (10th Cir 1981); 







STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by the limited 
partners (Appellees herein) of a Utah Limited Partnership known 
as D.S.T. Limited against the General Partner (Dixie Six 
Corporation) to determine the appropriate division of the 
partnership profits. 
Proceedings Below 
Pertinent proceedings below include: 
A. On September 23, 1983, Plaintiffs/Appellees Vivian M. 
Scheller and Steven D. Tollstrup ("Scheller and Tollstrup") 
filed suit in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County seeking a declaratory judgment against Defendant/ 
Appellant Dixie Six Corporation ("Dixie Six").4 
B. On May 10, 1985, following trial without jury, the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder ruled that under the terms of the 
written contract between the parties, the profits, after 
payment of expenses to both parties and a real estate 
commission to Dixie Six Corporation, should be divided equally 
between the parties; judgment was entered accordingly on June 
18, 1985.5 
4R. at 2-14. 
5R. at 129-131. 
3 
C. Scheller and Tollstrup appealed Judge Conder's 
decision; the Court of Appeals, under case number 20850, 
affirmed in part and reversed in part, ruling that the contract 
of the parties did not provide for a split in the profits in 
the event improvements on the property were not constructed and 
directing that the trial court determine, on the basis of 
quantum meruit, the value of the services of the general 
partner, Dixie Six Corporation. The Court of Appeals' decision 
is reported at 753 P.2d 971 (1988).6 
D. Defendant, believing that the Court of Appeals failed 
to consider a provision in the parties' contract (Article 
XVIII) requiring a 50/50 split of profits in the event of 
dissolution, petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a Writ of 
Certiorari on May 25, 1988. The petition was denied. 
E. On remand, the matter was tried before the Honorable 
Leonard H. Russon in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt 
Lake County, on November 21, 1989. The trial judge ruled that 
he was precluded from hearing evidence of the content of the 
agreement of the parties because of the statement of the Court 
of Appeals in its decision that no such term existed in the 
agreement. The trial judge concluded that the "law of the 
6R. at 332-336 and 344-349. 
4 
case" doctrine prevented him from making a finding different 
from that of the Court of Appeals.7 
F. The trial court ruled that the sole issue before it 
was the valuation of the efforts of the general partner. It 
further ruled that the value should not be determined by 
looking at what the parties would have agreed to when the 
partnership agreement was entered into, but rather by looking 
at the hours worked and services actually performed, as nearly 
as they could be reconstructed.8 
G. On April 17, 1990, Judge Russon entered his Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.9 This appeal is 
taken from the judgment dated April 17, 1990. 
H. Both Scheller and Tollstrup and Dixie Six filed 
Motions for Summary Disposition with the Utah Supreme Court, 
which were denied. 
STATEMENT OP THE FACTS 
1. In March of 1979, Scheller and Tollstrup and Dixie Six 
entered into a limited partnership agreement for the purpose of 
developing a certain piece of real property owned by Scheller 
7R. at 399, 401, 409. 
8R. at 401-403. 
9 Findings of Fact and Conclus ions of Law (R. 408-410) and 
Judgment (R. a t 416-417) da ted A p r i l 17, 1990. 
5 
and Tollstrup in Salt Lake County, Utah. The limited 
partnership was named D.S.T. Ltd. ("D.S.T.") .10 
2. Dixie Six contributed $10,000 toward the initial 
capital for the limited partnership, and Scheller and Tollstrup 
conveyed the property to D.S.T.11 
3. Dixie Six spent considerable time, effort, and money 
developing the property, but D.S.T. was unable to obtain 
financing for the project.12 
4. In early 1983, Scheller agreed to a sale of the 
property by D.S.T. to an entity known as P.F. West. For 
irrelevant reasons, the sale was never completed.13 
5. Eventually, the property was sold to Busch Development 
Company ("Busch") on essentially the same terms as the proposed 
sale to P.F. West. Scheller and Tollstrup received a total of 
$915,032.03 from the sale of the property.14 
10R. at 12, 383-384. 
nR. at 385. 
12R. at 386-388. 
13R. at 388-389. 
14R. at 124-125. 
6 
6. A dispute arose among the parties concerning whether 
Dixie Six was entitled to share in the profits generated from 
the sale.15 
7. On September 23, 1983, Scheller and Tollstrup filed 
suit in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
seeking a declaratory judgment limiting Dixie Six to the 
recovery of its expenses plus the 6% sales commission for the 
sale of the property to Busch, and prohibiting Dixie Six from 
sharing in the profit from the sale as set forth in the limited 
partnership agreement.16 
8. On May 10, 1985, following trial without jury, the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder ruled that Dixie Six did not breach 
the limited partnership agreement and that Dixie Six had 
developed and marketed the property in accordance with the 
terms of the limited partnership agreement.17 
9. The trial court found that Scheller and Tollstrup were 
estopped from claiming that Dixie Six was not entitled to a 
full share of its profits in accordance with the terms of the 
limited partnership agreement.18 
15R. at 2-3. 
16R. at 2-4. 
17R. at 125. 
18R. at 126. 
7 
10. Finally, the trial court concluded that Scheller and 
Tollstrup waived the claims set forth in their Complaint. On 
June 18, 1985, judgment was entered in favor of Dixie Six.19 
11. Scheller & Tollstrup then appealed Judge Conder's 
decision. In Judge Orme's written opinion, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part as follows: 
1. It determined that, contrary to the 
trial court's finding, Scheller and 
Tollstrup were not estopped by their 
conduct in not objecting to the two prior 
sales and in only objecting to the 
distribution of the proceeds from the sale 
to Busch after the sale had taken place. 
2. It found that the trial court's 
definition of the term "develop" was 
incorrect in that Dixie Six was under an 
obligation to "build" something on the 
property. 
3. Finally, the Court of Appeals found 
that, in the event of a breach, no 
contractual provision existed as to the 
allocation of the proceeds if the property 
was sold undeveloped and, therefore, Dixie 
Six is only entitled to recover under a 
quantum meruit theory of compensation. 
Scheller v. Dixie Six, 753 P.2d 971 (Utah App. 1988) .20 
12. On or about May 25, 1988, Dixie Six petitioned the 
Utah Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari. The petition was 
denied. 
19R. at 129-130. 
20R. at 344-349. 
8 
13. On remand the matter was tried before the Honorable 
Leonard H. Russon, Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County, on November 21, 1989. Judge Russon concluded that he 
was bound by the "law of the case" doctrine to accept the Court 
of Appeals' finding that the parties' limited partnership 
agreement contained no provision addressing the allocation of 
the sales proceeds in the event of a breach by Dixie Six. On 
April 17, 1990, Judge Russon entered Judgment awarding Dixie 
Six the sum of $36,000 as the value of its efforts to develop 
the property.21 This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed error when it refused to hear 
evidence which would have disclosed that the Court of Appeals 
was mistaken when it concluded that the parties' agreement 
contained no provision as to the allocation of the proceeds 
under the circumstances of the case. The trial court 
erroneously concluded that the law of the case doctrine 
prevented it from reexamining the parties' agreement. The law 
of the case doctrine is not an inflexible prohibition against 
departure from legal parameters earlier announced in a case. 
Furthermore, the doctrine only applies to legal conclusions. 
By refusing to take evidence which would have revealed the 
21R. at 416-417. 
9 
Court of Appeals's erroneous factual conclusion, the trial 
court committed error. 
The trial court also erred in its determination of the 
reasonable value of Dixie Six's services. As mandated by the 
Court of Appeals, the trial court sought to determine the 
amount of additional compensation to which Dixie Six is 
entitled under a theory of quantum meruit. Rather than 
determining the reasonable value of Plaintiff's services based 
on the facts and circumstances existing at the time, and the 
risks allocated to each party under the agreement, the trial 
court attempted to reconstruct the actual hours expended by 
Dixie Six in rendering the services. In doing so, the trial 
court committed error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY REFUSING TO 
CONSIDER EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES1 AGREEMENT. 
The first question presented is whether the trial court's 
rigid adherence to the "law of the case" was manifest error. 
Both before and at the trial before Judge Russon, Dixie Six 
pointed out that the Court of Appeals was mistaken when it 
concluded that the parties' agreement contained no provision 
"as to the allocation of proceeds in the event that Dixie Six 
10 
failed to develop the property as required by the agreement." 
Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 
1988) J1 The trial court refused to hear or consider evidence 
of the parties' agreement, limiting the inquiry to "the sole 
question [of] whether Dixie Six was entitled to any 
compensation in quantum meruit . . . .H23 The following 
dialogue illustrates the trial court's position: 
MR. ADAMSON: The additional item that we 
did speak of in chambers, and I want to 
make a clear record on and we discussed 
was the fact that in its decision the 
Court of Appeals says that there is no 
contract provision which provides for what 
is to be done on the dissolution of the 
partnership. And it is our position that 
the Court of Appeals has misread the 
contract and failed to take note of those 
provisions in our brief which point out 
what the contract said. 
THE COURT: Well, that issue is not before 
this court. 
MR. ADAMSON: I understand that, Your 
Honor. I just want to make a clear record 
on it and point out and request the Court 
^Dixie Six's position concerning allocation of the 
proceeds upon sale of the property in an undeveloped state was 
argued to and accepted by the first trial court (See Judge 
Conder's Findings and Conclusions dated 6/18/85 attached to 
Brief of Appellants in Case No. 20850), argued to the Court of 
Appeals (See Brief of Respondent, Case No. 20850 at pp. 22-27), 
and argued to the Supreme Court in Dixie Six's Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari (Petition, Case No. 860147-CA at Point I). 
^Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Civil No. 
830906862CV, dated April 17, 1990 (R. at 408-410). 
11 
to make a finding that the provision of 
118 does exist in the contract and a 
Conclusion of Law that because of the fact 
the Court of Appeals has said that it is 
not, that it is not before the Court. 
THE COURT: And now that the Court of 
Appeals has ruled, I am not going to open 
back up any of the provisions of the 
contract because they have ruled that 
there may be recovery under quantum meruit 
in this particular case and they gave the 
reasons why and it was reversed only to 
that single issue. And the only evidence 
I will receive will be evidence that goes 
to that single issue. 
Trial Tr. (11/21/89) at 3-5. 
The "law of the case" doctrine is not an inflexible 
prohibition against departure from a rule of law earlier 
announced in a case.24 Rather, it is a rule "of expedition, 
designed to bring about a quick resolution of disputes by 
preventing continued reargument of issues already decided." 
Major v. Benton, 647 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 1981). The 
doctrine may be disregarded when necessary to avoid an "unjust 
decision." Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 696 P.2d 1308, 
1314 (Cal. 1985). 
24See Major v. Benton, 647 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1981); 
Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 676 P.2d 1308 (Cal. 1985). 
12 
Moreover, the doctrine only applies to legal conclusions, 
as its name implies.25 The Court of Appeals1 s conclusion 
concerning the content of the parties1 agreement was a factual 
conclusion. As such, it was not subject to the "law of the 
case" doctrine. 
Finally, the conclusion is wrong. The Court of Appeals 
held that the conduct of the parties established a contract 
implied in fact, entitling Dixie Six to a recovery in quantum 
meruit.26 The Court of Appeals premised its holding on its 
finding that " . . . there was simply no agreement between the 
parties as to the allocation of proceeds in the event that 
Dixie Six failed to develop the property as required by the 
agreement." Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971, 975 
(Utah App. 1988). 
This finding ignored Articles XVIII and IX of the parties' 
agreement. If Dixie Six failed to perform its obligations, 
Scheller1s and Tollstrup's remedy is contained in Article XVIII 
of the Limited Partnership Agreement, entitled "Dissolution of 
Partnership," which reads as follows: 
^Searle, 696 P.2d at 1314. 
26Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
13 
The partnership shall be dissolved upon 
the occurrence of any of the following 
events: 
(a) the sale of all property to third 
parties. 
(b) the bankruptcy, insolvency, 
receivership or involuntary dissolution 
of Dixie. 
(c) upon written notice by the limited 
partners, if Dixie shall fail to 
perform its obligations hereunder and 
such failure shall continue for a 
period of thirty (30) days after 
receipt of such written notice. 
In the event of a dissolution as provided 
hereinabove, the partnership shall 
immediately begin to wind up its affairs. 
The proceeds from liquidation of 
partnership assets, after payment to all 
creditors of the partnership in the order 
of priority provided by law, shall be paid 
and applied in accordance with Article IX 
hereinabove. 
In the event that Dixie Six failed to satisfy its 
obligation to develop the property, the remedy is to have 
D.S.T. liquidated and the proceeds from the liquidation 
distributed in accordance with Article IX of the limited 
partnership agreement. Article IX, 59.2, states: 
9.2 Receipts of the partnership shall be 
allocated as follows: 
(a) First, to the actual expenses of 
the partnership or Dixie relative to 
the subdividing, development, 
improvement and sale of the property, 
such expenses to be itemized on a 
14 
monthly statement provided to the 
limited partners. 
(b) Second, to payment to the limited 
partners for the real property. 
(c) Third, one-half of the remainder 
to Dixie and one-half of the remainder 
to the limited partners. 
The Court of Appeals was wrong in its conclusion that the 
parties' agreement contained no provision for the allocation of 
the proceeds on failure of Dixie Six to perform as 
contemplated. On remand, Dixie Six made it clear that the 
Court of Appeals overlooked the contract provision. As the 
California Supreme Court noted in Searle v. Allstate, under 
these circumstances the law of the case doctrine has no 
application: 
The primary purpose served by the law-of-
the-case rule is one of judicial economy. 
Finality is attributed to an initial 
appellate ruling so as to avoid the 
further reversal and proceedings on remand 
that would result if the initial ruling 
were not adhered to in a later appellate 
proceeding. (Citations omitted) That 
reason for the rule is inoperative when 
the court hearing the subsequent appeal 
determines that there should be a reversal 
on a ground that was not considered on the 
prior appeal. 
Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 696 P.2d at 1314. 
Evidence concerning the provision in the parties' 
agreement relating to allocation of the proceeds was not 
15 
considered by the Court of Appeals. Judge Russon committed 
manifest error when he concluded that he was prohibited by the 
law of the case doctrine from hearing evidence of the parties' 
agreement, evidence not considered by the Court of Appeals. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION OP THE 
REASONABLE VALUE OF DIXIE SIX'S SERVICES. 
As the Court of Appeals pointed out in Scheller v. Dixie 
Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971 (Utah App. 1988), recovery in quantum 
meruit ". . .is for the amount the parties can be said to have 
reasonably intended as the contract price." Id. at 975. The 
best evidence of what the parties "reasonably intended as the 
contract price" is the contract itself. As noted above, the 
parties specifically addressed "the contract price," but the 
trial court felt bound by the law of the case doctrine to focus 
on evidence other than the parties' agreement. 
The direction given on remand was simply to determine "the 
amount of additional compensation to which Dixie Six is 
entitled under a theory of quantum meruit." Id. at 976. 
Assuming no contract provision, as the Court of Appeals did, 
the direction was to "infer the amount [the parties intended] 
to be the reasonable value of the plaintiff's services." Id. 
at 975. 
16 
Given this direction, the trial court was faced with 
either evaluating the issue based on the facts and 
circumstances existing at the time the parties entered into the 
contract, including the risks allocated to each party by the 
terms of the contract, or by determining the value of the 
services based on what was actually done by the party seeking 
compensation. In choosing the latter approach, the trial court 
committed error. 
The trial court attempted to reconstruct what actually 
happened, which had the effect of ignoring the risks and duties 
allocated by the agreement. The situation is not unlike an 
attorney-client contingent fee agreement. A hindsight analysis 
of the reasonable value of the services provided by an attorney 
under a contingent fee agreement can take into consideration 
only the hours expended by the attorney. The obvious error in 
analyzing the issue from this perspective, however, is that it 
does not take into consideration the risks assumed by the 
attorney in taking the case, including the risk of no recovery, 
nor does it give any credence to the express intentions of the 
parties. 
Likewise, the trial court's attempt to value the services 
provided by Dixie Six based on the amount of time expended by 
Dixie Six ignores the facts and circumstances existing at the 
17 
time the agreement was made, ignores the express intent of the 
agreement itself, and ignores the allocation of risks between 
the parties. Like an attorney entering into a contingent fee 
agreement, Dixie Six's compensation was dependent on a positive 
result from its development efforts. Dixie Six agreed to put 
up $10,000 in initial capitalization plus over $70,000 in costs 
for the chance to share in any profits eventually generated by 
its efforts. 
The only evidence before the trial court on the reasonable 
value of the services provided by Dixie Six in light of these 
facts and circumstances was given by Richard Moffit, a real 
estate broker and developer with The Boyer Company.27 Mr. 
Moffit testified that the reasonable value of the services 
provided by Dixie Six, considering the risks, is 30% of the net 
profits.28 The trial court chose to ignore Mr. Moffit's 
testimony, instead basing its decision on a reconstruction of 
the hours expended. In doing so, the trial court committed 
error. 
^Mr. Moffit's testimony begins at p. 148 of the transcript 
of trial (11/21/89). 
28Trial Tr. (11/22/89) at 15. 
18 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the trial court's decision 
should be reversed and the matter remanded for further 
consideration of the parties' agreement and its bearing on the 
issue of the amount of additional compensation due to Dixie 
Six. 
DATED: May J?__, 1991. 
^ _ ^ v _ } K^ ^ 
Craig G. Adamson 
Eric P. Lee 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
19 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the "7 day of May, 1990, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Walter P. Faber 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
20 
